

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 DAR ES 03296 01 OF 02 151603Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----040704 151605Z /44

O 151350Z AUG 77 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5910

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 3296

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PASS LONDON, LUSAKA, PRETORIA, USUN IF DESIRED

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: RH, TZ  
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT NYERERE ON RHODESIAN PROBLEM

REF: DAR ES SALAAM 3290

1. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT NYERERE INTERPRETS AUGUST 15 LETTER TO HIM FROM PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN AS CONFIRMATION HIS FEAR THAT BRITISH DO NOT ACCEPT THAT NEW ZIMBABWE ARMY IS TO BE BASED PREDOMINANTLY ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT BUT RATHER THAT UK INTENDS TO PRESERVE SMITH ARMY, WHICH WOULD MAKE NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IMPOSSIBLE. END SUMMARY.

2. A HALF HOUR AFTER REFTEL WAS DESPATCHED, PRESIDENT NYERERE CALLED ME TO STATE HOUSE TO SHOW ME A LETTER HE HAD JUST RECEIVED FROM PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN. HE ASKED THAT I SUPPLY TEXT (PARA 6 BELOW) TO PRESIDENT CARTER ON CONFIDENTIAL BASIS BECAUSE IT CLARIFIES THE PROBLEM WE ALL FACE IN LONDON: THE BRITISH, UNLIKE PRESIDENT CARTER, STILL SEE SMITH ARMY AS BASE OF NEW FORCE FOR INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE. THIS MAKES FORWARD MOVEMENT IMPOSSIBLE.

3. IN COMMENTING ON LETTER, NYERERE CALLED ATTENTION TO FACT  
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THAT CALLAGHAN DOES NOT DEAL AT ALL WITH THE ELEMENTS OF WHICH THE NEW FORCE SHALL CONSIST BUT DOES EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR REASSURANCES FOR THE WHITE POPULATION, WHICH NYERERE INTERPRETS AS MEANING THE SMITH ARMY. THE UK, SAID NYERERE, BELIEVES ITS FUNCTION IS TO DISARM THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS AND CREATE A NEW FORCE WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE SOME OF THEM. THIS CANNOT BE. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAS AN ARMY WITH WHICH ALL PARTIES MUST

COOPERATE. THIS IS DIFFERENT FROM THE POLICE. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAS NO POLICE, SO THE SMITH POLICE, WITH LEADERSHIP AND IDEOLOGY CLEANED UP, CAN BE THE BASE. TOGETHER WITH THE UN FORCE, IT IS THE POLICE WHO WILL HAVE THE MAIN LAW AND ORDER JOB DURING THE TRANSITION ANYWAY.

4. I SAID I WOULD SEE THAT TEXT OF CALLAGHAN LETTER GOT TO PRESIDENT CARTER AND ASKED NYERERE IF HE WAS CONFIDENT WHEN HE SPOKE OF COOPERATION THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES WOULD INDEED COOPERATE REASONABLY WITH OTHER MILITARY GROUPS, E.G., UN FORCE AND ACCEPTABLE RESIDUAL ELEMENTS SMITH ARMY. "THEY WILL, BECAUSE WE HAVE POWER TO SEE TO IT THAT THEY DO," WAS NYERERE'S REPLY.

5. COMMENT: NYERERE WAS STILL IN EAGER, ABSORBED MOOD. HIS DOUBTS ABOUT UK INTENTIONS RE ARMY ARE, I BELIEVE, SINCERE: BUT THEY MAY NOT BE QUITE AS ABSOLUTE AS HE SUGGESTS. HE HAS ALWAYS SEEN ONE OF MAIN ATTRACTIONS OF US ROLE IN RHODESIA AS THAT OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE BRITISH TO DO MORE THAN THEY WOULD DO IF LEFT TO THEMSELVES. AND HE HAS LONG CONSIDERED NATURE OF THE ARMY KEY ISSUE IN ANY RHODESIAN SOLUTION.

6. CALLAGHAN LETTER FOLLOWS. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR JULIUS

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR LETTER, WHICH I WAS VERY  
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HAPPY TO RECEIVE. NOTHING COULD PLEASE ME MORE THAN TO HEAR FROM YOU THAT OUR FRIENDSHIP OF SO MANY YEARS CONTINUES UNABATED, AND I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I HEARTILY RECIPROATE YOUR GOOD WISHES. YOU CAN BE SURE THAT I WILL DO ALL I CAN TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT OUR JOINT EFFORTS IN THEIR OWN WAYS WILL BRING MAJORITY RULE TO THE NEW ZIMBABWE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

WHEN I BECAME PRIME MINISTER I WAS DETERMINED THAT WE WOULD MAKE A FRESH EFFORT TO TRY AND FIND A SOLUTION, AND SEIZE ANY CHANCE TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE. THIS WAS SO DURING THE LAST FEW MONTHS WHEN HENRY KISSINGER WAS SECRETARY OF STATE, AND WE RECEIVED GREAT ENCOURAGEMENT FROM PRESIDENT CARTER AFTER HE BECAME PRESIDENT. YOU HAVE NOW MET HIM AND YOU WILL HAVE ASSESSED, AS I DO, HIS STRONG COMMITMENT ON THIS MATTER. THE PRESENT ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF THE CHANGING SITUATION CREATED BY THE EFFORTS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND ALSO OF WHAT SEEMS TO BE A NEW APPRAISAL OF THE SITUATION BY SOUTH AFRICA. OUR CONCLUSIONS ARE THE RESULT OF CAREFUL DISCUSSION AND THOUGHT WITH MANY PEOPLE AND I WAS VERY GLAD TO HEAR THAT, AS A RESULT OF THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN YOU AND PRESIDENT CARTER, YOU WILL BE

INVITING THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS TO MEET AT AN EARLY DATE  
IN ORDER TO HEAR OUR JOINT PROPOSALS IN DETAIL FROM DAVID  
OWEN AND ANDY YOUNG. WE BELIEVE THAT THESE PROPOSALS SHOULD  
BE KNOWN TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA BEFORE THE FORTHCOMING  
ELECTION, AND IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS  
WILL FIND IT POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS THEM SO AS TO ENABLE THEM  
TO BE PUBLICISED BEFORE IT TAKES PLACE ON 31 AUGUST.

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-----040992 151631Z /44  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5911

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 3296

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PASS LONDON, LUSAKA, PRETORIA, USUN IF DESIRED

DAVID OWEN AND CYRUS VANCE HAVE BOTH TOLD ME ABOUT  
THEIR TALKS WITH YOU YESTERDAY, AND I AM VERY PLEASED THAT  
THERE IS SO MUCH IN THE PROPOSALS WITH WHICH YOU CAN AGREE.  
DAVID OWEN TELLS ME THAT YOU WENT AT ONCE TO THE HEART OF  
ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS - NAMELY, THE FUTURE OF  
THE RHODESIAN DEFENCE FORCES. THIS WAS NO SURPRISE BECUASE  
VICE-PRESIDENT JUMBE HAD RAISED THE ISSUE VERY FORCIBLY AT  
THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING. WE AND THE  
AMERICANS HAVE GIVEN A LOT OF THOUGHT TO THE MATTER, AND I  
HAVE ALSO DISCUSSED IT WITH JOSHUA NKOMO RECENTLY WHEN HE  
WAS IN LONDON. IF I UNDERSTAND THE POSITION CORRECTLY,  
YOUR POINT IS THAT WE HAVE, AS YET, NO FIRM PROPOSALS TO  
MAKE ABOUT THE DETAILED HANDLING OF THE VERY DELICATE ISSUE  
OF THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER DURING THE TRANSITION  
PERIOD: AND THAT THE RHODESIAN DEFENCE FORCES SHOULD CEASE  
TO EXIST ON TRANSFER DAY. ON THE QUESTION OF THE ARMED  
FORCES, THERE ARE THREE ISSUES AS I SEE THEM. FIRST, THE  
NEW ZIMBABWE MUST NOT BE REDUCED TO A SHAMBLES, FOLLOWING  
INDEPENDENCE, BY ARMED CLASHES BETWEEN TWO OR THREE  
COMPETITIVE FORCES. THEREFORE OUR VIEW IS THAT THE NEW  
ZIMBABWE DEFENCE FORCE MUST BE CREATED BY INDEPENDENCE DAY.

SECOND, THE NEW ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT MUST BE INSTALLED IN A WAY THAT WILL ENSURE ITS COMPLETE AUTHORITY AND CONTROL OVER  
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ITS OWN ARMED FORCES. THIRD, IT WILL BE OF ADVANTAGE TO THE FUTURE PROSPERITY OF ZIMBABWE IF WE CAN GIVE REASSURANCE ON LAW AND ORDER TO THE WHITE POPULATION, WHO ARE DEEPLY FEARFUL OF WHAT THE FUTURE MAY HOLD. THESE AIMS CAN BE RECONCILED BUT IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE THERE ARE REAL DIFFICULTIES AND A NUMBER OF OPTIONS RELATING TO THE PERIOD FROM TRANSFER DAY TO INDEPENDENCE DAY THAT DAVID OWEN AND ANDY YOUNG NEED TO DISCUSS ALL THIS WITH YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES. WE CANNOT TAKE IT FOR GRANTED THAT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL WILL BE READY TO ACCEPT WHAT WE PROPOSE. NOR WOULD WE BE ABLE TO PERSUADE OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO CONTRIBUTE FORCES TO A UN PRESENCE UNLESS WE CAN TELL THEM QUITE CLEARLY WHAT SUCH A COMMITMENT WOULD ENTAIL, AND THIS WILL NEED TO BE NEGOTIATED IN SOME DETAIL BETWEEN THE PARTIES, AND A SOLUTION FOUND WHICH IS SATISFACTORY NOT ONLY TO THE UN BUT ALSO TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, WHICH WILL HAVE TO BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER. THE US GOVERNMENT AND OURSELVES ARE TOTALLY AGREED ON THIS, IN PARTICULAR, ON THE DESIRABILITY OF INVITING THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL TO APPOINT A REPRESENTATIVE TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS, BEFORE THE TRANSITION PERIOD, WITH THE MAN WE SHALL BE APPOINTING AS OUR RESIDENT COMMISSIONER AND WITH ALL THE PARTIES, WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISHING IN DETAIL THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF ALL THE FORCES IN RHODESIA. BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS SEE THE ROLE OF THE UN/ZIMBABWE FORCE AS INCLUDING: THE SUPERVISION OF THE CEASE-FIRE; SUPPORT FOR THE CIVIL POWER: AND LIAISON WITH THE OTHER FORCES IN RHODESIA.

THE MEETING WHICH PRESIDENT CARTER HAS SUGGESTED WILL GIVE DAVID OWEN AND ANDY YOUNG THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLORE WITH YOU SOME OF THE POSSIBILITIES WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED IN DETAIL BEFORE THE UN MANDATE CAN BE SETTLED  
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AND BEFORE WE GO TO OUR PARLIAMENT FOR AUTHORISATION FOR A RESIDENT COMMISSIONER.

THIS COMES WITH MY BEST WISHES AND HOPES THAT YOUR EXPERIENCE WILL ENABLE US TO FIND A WAY THROUGH THIS SITUATION WHICH, IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL, HOLDS SO MUCH HOPE FOR THE FUTURE WELL-BEING OF ZIMBABWE.

YOURS SINCERELY

JIM CALLAGHAN

END TEXT.  
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## Message Attributes

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